

THE IMPLICATIONS OF KANT'S DIALECTIC FOR THE QUESTION OF THE WORLD'S TEMPORAL EXTENSION.

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1. INTRODUCTION

In his Transcendental Dialectic, Kant presents an argument whose conclusion states that the world has no temporal extension. Logically, the argument says that, if the world has temporal extension, under which "being finite in time" and "being infinite in time" are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive determinates, then it must be the case that both determinates are true of the world, i.e. it must be the case that the world is both finite and infinite. Since this is incompatible with the mutual exclusivity of the determinates, it therefore cannot be the case that the world has temporal extension. This argument is the temporal part (the other part concerns the world's spatial extension) of the first mathematical Antinomy of the Transcendental Dialectic. I refer to it as "tfMA".

In this essay, I ask under what conditions, if any, the conclusion of the tfMA follows and, more briefly, to what extent the resulting tfMA constitutes a worry for anybody that believes the world to have temporal extension. I argue that one (and probably only this one) set of conditions that bases on Kant's theory of pure reason does establish a "clash of rules of thinking". However, while this clash, I argue further, is as strong a conclusion as can follow from this set of conditions, *viz* the structure of antinomial arguments, it still does not produce a logical contradiction. I close by conjecturing that the tfMA *can* provide a sound argument for abstaining from metaphysical or ontological judgments about the temporal extension of the world.

Sec.2 introduces Kant's original formulation of the tfMA and discusses its possible interpretations and some objections. Sec.3 then presents Kant's theory of reason, followed by an clarification of its relevance for the tfMA in sec.4. This results in the formulation (5.1) of a valid tfMA and a brief discussion of the latter's soundness (5.2) and strength (5.3) to the above effect.

2. THE FIRST MATHEMATICAL ANTINOMY

According to Broad (1954), faced with apparently sound proofs of the truth (or falsity) of all of a set of mutually exhaustive and collectively exhaustive determinants of some characteristic for an object (say its temporal extension), concluding that the object does not have that characteristic is the *only* possible reaction other than questioning the soundness of the argument. Agreeing with Broad on this point, studying the soundness of the tfMA then is the only possibility to evade its conclusion.¹

¹There is, of course, the logical possibility that to be finite or infinite in time are not actually collectively exhaustive determinants of temporal extension. I disregard this possibility here in line with Kant and the secondary literature.

2.1. **The thesis.** The tfMA proceeds by first proving that, upon assuming that the world has temporal extension, it must be finite and then proving that, upon the same assumption, it must be infinite. Both arguments proceed by reductio. The thesis argument consists of the following steps (Grier, 2001, 184,189):²

SHOW The world has a beginning in time.

- (1) Assume the opposite: the world has no temporal beginning.
- (2) If (1), then up to every moment an eternity has already elapsed.
- (3) (2) is internally inconsistent, for an infinite series is by definition a series that has no completion.
- (4) Therefore it is impossible for an infinite series to have already elapsed.
- (5) Therefore the series of past (already elapsed) events cannot be infinite.
- (6) Therefore, the past series is finite (the world has a beginning in time). (A426/B454)

The idea here is that, if the world extends infinitely into the past, then for any moment M in its history, there exists an infinite series of moments in the past of M that is brought to an end at M , i.e. is “completed” at M . But this is inconsistent, since an infinite series by definition can never be completed. Therefore the world cannot extend infinitely into the past and hence has to extend finitely into it.

This argument has been described as “extremely cryptic and apparently [appealing] to arbitrary assumption” (Allison, 2004, 367). It invites a number of criticisms: To begin with, it seems that premise 3 describes a subjective concept of infinity. This is because the impossibility of completing an infinite series, in a mental act of successively synthesising the latter in steps, seems to have the character of failure of *apprehending* the completion of this series. But if this is true, then Kant’s argument is invalid because it infers an objective impossibility of existence from a subjective impossibility of apprehension. This criticism has been given, for example, by Kemp Smith (1962, 485), Russell (1914, 160p) or in (Guyer, 1987). A similar criticism is that it presupposes transcendental idealism to motivate the step from premises 3 to 4, which is problematic in that Kant’s overall argument is meant to provide a proof of the latter, see e.g. (Strawson, 1966, 176).³ Another criticism is that the argument involves a *petitio principii* in that the series cannot be completed only if the world’s temporal extension is already assumed to be finite Russell (1914); Strawson (1966). A third line of criticism contends that Kant simply neglects the possibility that a series that has one end can still be infinite and that therefore the step from premises 2 to 3 is invalid (e.g. (Moore, 1953, 181) and , (Bennett, 1974, 118p)). To discuss these criticisms adequately, I will first have to present Kant’s theory of reason in the next section.

2.2. **The anti-thesis.** The antithesis proceeds as follows:

SHOW The world has no beginning in time.

²For a world to have and not to have a beginning I take as synonymous to its having finite and infinite temporal extension/being finite and infinite respectively. What I do not take synonymous with these two pairs of alternatives is respective existence and non-existence of a *first event*. This latter will not be required for my solution but for a discussion see (Broad, 1954, 8p).

³Since it is not my aim here to discuss Kant’s use of the Antinomy as proof of transcendental idealism, the risk of circularity is no concern to my discussion. However, if it was the case that the assumption of transcendental idealism was required for the validity of the tfMA, then evading its consequences are simple to avoid by not subscribing to the former.

- (1) Suppose the world has a beginning, i.e. its existence is preceded by a time in which the world is not.
- (2) If (1), then the world must come to be in empty time.
- (3) (2) is incoherent. If time is empty, then there is no particular time which possesses a distinguishing condition of existence rather than nonexistence.
- (4) Therefore the world cannot have a beginning in time.
- (5) Therefore the world is infinite in past time. (A428/B456)

The statement of this argument leaves much room for interpretation and consequently commentators have found it difficult to agree on what it says and how it is meant to be read as a valid argument, let alone a sound one. To begin with, for premise 1 two senses of “beginning of the world” need to be distinguished: The *external* sense of its beginning with respect to an extra-mundane time; and the *internal* sense of the intra-mundane temporal ordering of its states. Strawson (1966, XX) points out that the question the conclusion of the argument does not follow if a beginning is understood in the internal sense. However, while this may be true, it is, from premise 1, clear that this Kant uses the external sense of beginning and, of course, the validity of an argument cannot be undermined by showing that changing the meaning of the terms changes the conclusion. Note further from premise 1 that the beginning of the world in Kant’s external sense implies an empty pre-mundane time. Bennett (1974, 51) argues that this is need not be the case.

The argument then tries to establish that the notion of a beginning of the world in the sense of premise 1 is incoherent. I distinguish three ways in which commentators have understood the antithesis to attempt to establish this conclusion: (1) Firstly, on empirical grounds by arguing that the experience of such a beginning would have to involve the perception of empty time, which is impossible. Bennett (1974, 160) quotes Kant as arguing for this (and finds himself in agreement with it). While this could hardly have been Kant’s intended argument in the antithesis (since it has nothing to do with premise 3), this is one possibility of arguing for the conclusion; (2) secondly, on effectively Leibnizian metaphysical grounds by arguing that given empty pre-mundane time there would be no way of distinguishing, per relationalism, an absolute time for the world to have begun. In Bennett’s words, this amounts to arguing that the question “When did the world begin?” is unanswerable.” (ibid., 159). Such a reading is proposed by Allison (2004, 373). However, Guyer pointed out that this reading does not license the argument’s ontological conclusion in that nothing precludes the world to have had a beginning at *some* time despite the above indistinguishability (Grier, 2001, 190); (3) thirdly, on grounds of the lack of an antecedent condition for the coming into being of the world. This third point can be understood, I think, in three flavours: (a) metaphysically, like (2) above (with the corresponding unanswerable question being ‘Why did the world begin when it began?’), as basing on Leibniz principle of sufficient reason. Broad (b) causally as involving the lack of a cause for the coming into being of the world, or (c) conceptually on the basis that the concept of the “world” is inconsistent with its beginning.

Broad (1954, 7) and Strawson (1966) interpret Kant along the first flavour, the former then criticising it on the ground that the metaphysical unanswerability it implies is insignificant (except in some special, theistic contexts *à la* “God knows!”), the latter on the ground that such an unanswerability does not imply the ontological conclusion that the world cannot have

had a beginning (in exact analogy to Guyer's counter in (2)). Next, while (b) might be the most obvious way of reading premise 3, Kant explicitly states that "[premise 3] applies whether the [world] is supposed to arise of itself or through some other cause." (quoted in (Bennett, 1974, 159). While then certainly not Kant's own interpretation, it remains a possible one. (c) is discussed by Grier (2001). Below I will argue that (c) allows for the construction of an Antinomy "as forceful as it gets". In order to do so and understand how the other criticism can arguably be met, it is necessary to sketch some of the features of Kant's theory of reason, which is to large parts developed in the somewhat neglected Appendix to the *Dialectic*.

3. THE DIALECTIC OF PURE REASON

For Kant, reason is 'the faculty that provides the principles of cognition (knowledge) a priori. Hence pure reason is that which contains the principles for cognizing something absolutely a priori' (A11/B24). Kant's answer to the basic question of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, how synthetic *a priori* judgments are possible, consists, of course, in arguing that pure reason structures the form of our experience. In particular, he argues that there are a priori laws according to which reason necessarily functions, i.e. that there are necessary principles of *pure* reason. Further, the cognitions to which reason gives rise necessarily reflect the existence of these principles in their form. By reflecting on our own experience - per transcendental deduction - we can recognise these forms and principles and will here necessarily, he finally argues, find that the synthetic *a priori* judgments that we are able to make are those judgments that unify the a priori representations of understanding - pure concepts, also called 'Categories' - and those of sensitivity - pure intuitions.

What is important in the context of this essay is Kant's account of how the laws of pure reason that govern the 'dialectic' of its working necessarily introduce an inevitable 'transcendental illusion', an erroneous judgment of the understanding. The aim of reason for Kant, as characterised by Grier (2001, 119), is "to order and unify the concepts of the understanding by subsuming them under principles [...], in accordance with the aim of securing systematic unity of thought." This aim manifests itself in the employment of syllogistic reasoning in the following sense: For Kant, a syllogism, say "All humans are mortal/Caius is human/Caius is mortal" is a particular instance of a general inference scheme in which a *conditioned* conclusion (Caius is mortal) is inferred from a rule (All humans are mortal) involving a condition (X is human) together with a mediating premise (Caius is human). Here, many conditioned conclusions are subsumed under the rule expressed in the major premise and, in this sense, the principle of *pure* reason that asserts that syllogisms are valid forms of inference (quoted by Allison (2004, 311) from an earlier work of Kant as "What stands under the condition of a rule also stands under the rule itself") unifies all such conditioned conclusions (ibid.). However, in its aiming for systematic unity of thought, reason strives for a unification, "rational grounding", not only of the conclusions of the above syllogism but also of their rules, i.e. their major premises, by means of a higher prosyllogism. In this prosyllogism the rule itself will appear as conditioned. The "subjective law" (A306/B363), of which this striving for unification is the result, is formulated by Kant as follows:

P_1 Find for the conditioned knowledge given through the understanding the unconditioned whereby its unity is brought to completion.

This is a law of *pure* reason. The unconditioned here would be a major premise in one of the prosyllogisms that terminates the regress induced by the above process of rational grounding by unifying all the conditioned knowledge it subsumes without standing itself in need of rational grounding.

Importantly, and crucially for the main debate, P_1 expresses a fact about the subjective unity that *reason* seeks and *not* about the objects, because by not conforming to the requirements of possible experience (space and time) it “does not contain any general ground of the possibility of knowing or determining objects as such” (A306/B363). Consequently, P_1 does not justify inferences from the systematic unity of cognition to a corresponding unity in objects themselves. At the same time, Kant further claims, the assumption of the possibility of such inferences is a natural, even necessary, feature of reason when it carries out P_1 . That is, it is natural to commit to

P_2 If the conditioned is given, the whole series of conditions, subordinated to one another [...] is likewise given, that is, is contained in the objects and its connection. (A308/B364)

P_2 , which Kant calls the “supreme principle of pure reason”, is, unlike P_1 , not a subjective law but a “transcendental” principle asserting an objective necessity. The “illusion” it expresses is that pure reason infers (a) from the experience of the conditioned the unconditioned as possible object of experience and (b) from the form of the former experience the form of the latter. As Grier argues, this illusion that P_2 produces is inevitable, indeed it grounds the positive function of pure reason in providing the means for the systematic unification of experience. It does so by taking the unconditioned as a *focus imaginarius* against which actual, conditioned experience is compared and systematised. The concepts of pure reason, the so-called “transcendental ideas” are just such foci: Kant, in a notoriously opaque argument, argues (on the basis on the three forms of relational synthesis from his table of categories - categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive) that there are exactly three such ideas - the “soul”, the “world”, “God”. Here, the “world” is the absolute unity of the series of conditions of appearance. That is, given a series of appearances, pure reason will “use” the (illusory) idea of a world, used as a *focus imaginarius* in order to understand these appearances systematically as states of this world.

The crucial point, and the point that Grier argues has not been sufficiently kept distinct from the above illusion, is that P_2 involves a translation of the ontological character of the conditions to the unconditioned. For the case of appearances this means that any position that mistakes the appearances with the things in themselves - and therefore erroneously projects space and time as the former’s pure forms of intuition onto the latter - will make the same mistake with the transcendental idea of the world, i.e. take this world to be subject to space-time just like the appearances from which it was derived by pure reason. This mistake is what characterises “transcendental realism” which “may be understood to include all those philosophical positions which, from a Kantian perspective, systematically conflate ‘appearances and things in themselves’ ” (Grier, 2001, 98).

This mistake of transcendental realism, together with inevitable working of the logic of pure reason, then, is what produces the problem for Kant.

4. THE ROAD TO VALIDITY

4.1. **Kant's basic idea.** Can we use something like Kant's theory of reason to produce a valid Antinomy that meets the various criticism introduced above? To answer this question it is instructive to see how Kant himself sets out to resolve the alleged contradiction in the Antinomies.

From the point of view of the last section, each of the Antinomies of Pure Reason then arises on the basis of a fallacy in the following syllogism (Grier, 2001, 175):

- If the conditioned is given, the entire series of all conditions [i.e. the unconditioned] is likewise given.
- Objects of the senses are given as conditioned.
- Therefore, the entire series of all conditions of objects of the senses [the "world"] is already given.

For the case of the tFMA, the unconditioned, or entire series, is just the transcendental idea of the "world". The fallacy that the transcendental realist commits, to mistake the appearances with the things in themselves, here enter the syllogism via the fallacy of the ambiguous middle. Specifically, it consists in the equivocation of the "conditioned" in the two premises: While "conditioned" in the major premise carries a transcendental meaning, it carries an empirical meaning in the minor premise. But the transcendental realist does not draw that distinction. As a consequence, for the transcendental realist the space-time that accompanies the empirical conditions in the minor premise is fallaciously taken to apply to the world as a whole. As an implication of this, for her the world is then either finite or infinite.

It is certainly true that the final steps in the thesis and antithesis, the inference to one of two possibilities in the light of the absurd consequences implied by the other, necessarily require the belief that those two possibilities are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive - i.e. the above belief that the world is either finite or infinite. However, this is only one step in both arguments. We need to ask whether Kant's account of reason also renders the other steps in the arguments valid.

4.2. **The thesis.** For the case of the thesis, Allison (2004, 365p) argues that the world must, according to Kant's theory of pure reason, be thought of as a *totum syntheticum*. A *totum syntheticum* is "a whole composed of parts that are given separately (at least in thought)". It is to be contrasted with a *totum analyticum*, which is "a whole, the parts of which are only possible with reference to that whole".⁴ According to Allison, the "thought of complete enumeration or "synthesis" of its parts [...] is built into [the] concept" of a *totum syntheticum* (ibid., 370). Being a whole of this kind, the idea of the world implies the thought of the complete enumeration of its parts, i.e. the appearances constitute the series whose entirety it is. Similarly, the concept of infinity has the notion of inexhaustibility built into it. Understood in this way, both the accusation of psychologism by Kemp Smith and company as well as that of Strawson and Bennett regarding the possibility of infinite series with one end miss their point: Regarding the former, it is the *concept* of an infinity that implies its inexhaustibility, not a feature of psychological apprehendability. As these conceptual features of the concepts "world" and "infinity" further are a consequence of Kant's theory of reason, not his transcendental

⁴See Al-Azm (1972, 9-22) for a discussion of these two notions.

idealism, the latter need not be tacitly assumed. Regarding the latter, it is clear that the series whose entirety is the world, as a *totum syntheticum*, cannot be infinite, even if it has one end.

Understood as *totum syntheticum* and from the perspective of the transcendental realist, the thesis then seems to constitute a valid argument.

4.3. The Antithesis. The case of the antithesis requires a bit more care. Recall first that, from the brief discussion of the antithesis, we took away that Kant takes the external sense of a “beginning of the world” to imply an empty pre-mundane time and that this still leaves several possible ways of understanding it *viz* premise 3. I ended by claiming that a conceptual interpretation of this premise, (3c), was able to produce “as forceful an Antinomy as it gets”.⁵ Let me now present my arguments for this claim.⁶

My argument will, just as in the case of the thesis, consist in sketching a conceptual notion of “world” that (a) can be seen to arise from Kant’s theory of reason and that (b), from a transcendental realist perspective, arguably renders the argument of the antithesis valid.

The notion in question is that the world constitutes the *absolute* totality of all appearances. In particular, it builds on the idea that “[p]erhaps a better way of understanding [premise 3] is to draw on Kant’s suggestion that the world, as the “absolute” totality of all appearances, cannot coherently be asserted bear any real relations to a framework of empty space-time” (Grier, 2001, 190). I can nowhere find a presentation of this suggestion (by Grier or elsewhere), but I stipulate that “absolute” here means the same as it does in Kant’s discussion of the Paralogism of Pure Reason (where the transcendental idea is not the “world” but the “soul”). In book 1, section 2 of the *Dialectic* Kant discusses two meanings of the term “absolute”, one *logical* and referring to something that is valid in all respects, the other *metaphysical* and referring to that which is true as a thing in itself. While these two are clearly distinct, Kant argues, in his discussion of the Paralogisms of pure reason, that as a result of the illusion-fostering dialectic of pure reason, “the absolute (unrestricted) and logical unity of the thinking subject (the “I”) is hypostatized into the absolute and real unity of a metaphysical entity” (Grier, 2001, 169). I think it is not difficult to see how this hypostatization can result from the application of P_2 , in that the concept of an absolute totality constitutes a form of *focus imaginarius*. That the “absolute” in Grier’s quote above comes with the same meanings and is subject to the same illusionary promotion as in the Paralogisms I stipulate because of it seems to render this quote reasonable: Under this stipulation, I understand an “absolute totality of all appearances” to be an entity that unifies all logically and metaphysically possible appearances, according to the respective senses of “absolute”. Of course, the notion of metaphysically possible appearance is incoherent from a Kantian perspective but it is exactly in their possibility that the illusion of pure reason consists. Equipped with these interpretations, Kant’s suggestion that the world as absolute totality of all appearances cannot bear any relation to a framework of empty space-time can, I submit, be understood against the background of two independent factors: Firstly, the working of pure

⁵I do not claim that such a viable Antinomy could not be established along one of the other readings. Since most of these are, however, accompanied by valid criticisms, it is difficult to see how this could be achieved.

⁶Even though exegesis is not my interest in this essay, I also think that (3c) is the only exegetically viable one of the considered alternatives. In support of this, let me here just say that I have commented on this for (1) already in the text. Regarding (2) and (3a), some weak support can be derived from Kant’s embedding of the discussion of the Antinomies in the debate between Plato and Epicurus rather than Leibniz and Newton, where the former is arguably more conceptual (in Kant’s sense) in character than metaphysical (Grier, 2001, 187). Regarding (3b), Kant explicitly allows for the beginning to be uncaused or self-caused (Bennett, 1974, 159).

reason that results in the world being conceptualised metaphysically rather than logically; and secondly, transcendental realism that takes all appearances to be metaphysical, in conflating them with the things in themselves. Specifically, the latter (conflation) implies that the world is situated in space and time, while the former (illusion) implies that it is situated in *all* of it. Hence the notion of there being some entity (“empty space-time”) that is situated in space and time but not subsumed under the world *qua* absolute totality is incoherent. This concludes my argument for (a).

For (b), from the above we recognise that the *reductio* simply expresses the character of world understood as absolute totality: The world, *qua* absolute totality, cannot have a beginning in the externalist sense simply on pain of *conceptual incoherence*. Premise 3 is, admittedly, an unnecessarily complicated way of articulating this incoherence via antecedent conditions (whose relation to the notion of absolute totality is actually not quite clear).⁷

4.4. Relating thesis and anti-thesis. There is one obvious problem, though: I have argued that the thesis and anti-thesis become valid if “world” is understood as *totum syntheticum* and absolute totality respectively. Even though both of these have been linked to Kant’s theory of reason, how can they produce an Antinomy if they are concerned with entirely different things? (Guyer, 1987, Ch. 18) has argued along those lines, by contrasting Kant’s pre-critical versions of the Antinomies from the critical one. Grier’s counter consists in first pointing out that indeed from the Kantian, transcendental idealist standpoint there is no conflict and that the principles of reason and the *foci* they produce should be regarded *methodologically*. The clash arises, again, on the basis of the transcendental realist conflation of noumena and appearances, by mistaking the principles of reason to “compete for application in the same domain” (Grier, 2001, 194). We have seen how this conflation was crucial to the thesis and anti-thesis. But care should be taken, I think, to use transcendental realism as panacea for all problems of the tfMA:

It is one thing to see that the products of a particular method, or “rules of thinking a totality” could be ontologically misconstrued, and thus how the arguments of the thesis and antithesis follow. It is another thing to see that two (or more) such misconstruals necessarily project onto the *same* ontological plane! It is, I think, not clear that “time” in the two arguments, denotes the same ontological time. Rules of thinking are complex methodological objects and an adequate account of their ontological misconstrual needs to reflect this. Neither Kant’s account, nor Grier’s, seems to me to achieve this, possibly because, from a Kantian perspective, there is only one ontological sense of “time”. Thus, I submit, the tfMA produces an outright *logical contradiction* only for a bavarian⁸ transcendental realist with un-sophisticated ontology and only a *clash* for any non-bavarian transcendental realist.

5. A VALID ANTINOMY

5.1. Formulation. We are now, finally, in a position to formulate two version of the tfMA, one logically valid, the other producing merely a clash. I take the above discussion to indicate

⁷If it was the case that the world as absolute totality required the existence of (non-causal) antecedent conditions, as Grier (2001, 190) states without qualification, then this could also be used to counter Bennett’s counter to Kant’s assumption in premise 1: There could not be a first event at a first time of this world in an external sense. Since this requirement, however, is not obvious, the feasibility of premise 1 rests on either making this connection or arguing that Bennett’s alternative, the possibility of world’s beginning as a first event at a first time, is incoherent and the only alternative. See (Allison, 2004, 375) for the latter option.

⁸The “barbarians” of Eastern Prussia and 18th century Königsberg.

that a lot of the confusion about the Antinomy, an inability to appreciate its force, to rest on an overly independent treatment of the thesis and anti-thesis. I believe that the full force of the Antinomy is best seen by symmetrising its presentation, as follows. There are at least two ways for (pure) reason to project appearances against a *focus imaginarius*: the unconditioned as absolute totality and the unconditioned as *totum syntheticum*. Both of these are necessary in their function to organise experience, i.e. to systematise these appearances as states of the world. This necessity manifests itself, for example, in our impossibility to think of the world as *not* being one of these two. These two senses of the world are not mutually exclusive because they do not apply to the same domain, i.e. it is never the case that only one of them could be true. However, in the case in which we project the qualities of the conditioned experience - the appearances -, in particular their conforming to space and time, onto the unconditioned “world”, the two *foci imaginarii* apply to (i) the same domain and produce a contradiction (ii) a similar domain and produce a clash.

If by an Antinomy we mean such a clash, then I take the previous discussion to show that this symmetric version of the tfMA is valid under the following assumptions: (1) Adequacy of the basic Kantian framework including appearances, concepts and the discussion of space and time as the pure forms of intuition in the Transcendental Aesthetic; (2) Adequacy of Kant’s theory of (pure) reason including (a) illusion it necessarily and constructively produces, according to P_1 and P_2 and (b) the transcendental idea of the “world” as both absolute totality and *totum syntheticum*; (3i) non-bavarian transcendental realism/(3ii) bavarian transcendental realism.

5.2. Soundness. So far I left undiscussed the question of the *soundness* of the tfMA. It seems quite clear that premises (1) - (3) are all false. Of course, the falsehood of (3) is exactly the conclusion that Kant draws in the light of his arguments for (1) and (2). From a contemporary perspective, however, nobody would accept (1) or (2) as they are stated here. Yet, I am inclined to think that similar, updated premises that are based on contemporary theories of perception and the organisation of knowledge are much more feasible and produce clashes from which the same kinds of morals can be drawn, at least those for (3ii)

5.3. Strength. A valid argument is not to be argued with and establishing the (i)-version of the tfMA would enforce Kant’s conclusion. But this is unrealistic. Still, I believe that a sufficiently strong (ii)-version can be defended in which the resulting clash can motivate an abstinence from judgements about the temporal extent of the concept of the world as a whole. This latter version, then, is the Antinomy “as forceful as it can be”, as used above. I do not have the space here to argue for this belief and hence conclude my essay in the style of every good essay - with a conjecture.

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